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1963] RECENT DECISIONS 609
FuTuRE INTER sTs--RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-CY PREs APPLIED To
MODIFY AN INTEREST VIOLATING TE RuL_-Testator's will created a trust
for his grandchildren which was to terminate "when my youngest grand-
child (whether now living or hereafter born) shall become twenty-five
years of age." As it would be possible for the youngest grandchild to
become twenty-five beyond the period permitted by the Rule Against Per-
petuities,' the chancellor held the class gift invalid. The state supreme
court reversed,2 and ruled that since the trust allowed payment of income
to the beneficiary as needed, the interests vested upon the death of the
testator.3 On suggestion of error, held, overruled, judgment modified and
corrected. The interests may be modified through application of the
equitable doctrine of cy pres to avoid the effect of the Rule Against
Perpetuities; as such, the trust will terminate when the youngest grand-
child reaches the age of twenty-one. Carter v. Berry, 140 So. 2d 843
(Miss. 1962).
At common law the interests of each and every member of a class
must vest within the period permitted by the Rule Against Perpetuities,
or else the entire class gift will fail.4 The leading case embodying this
principle, Leake v. Robinson,5 has been followed in every American juris-
diction to rule on the issue,6 although the doctrine itself has been subject
1 "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest." GRAY, TnE RuLrE AGAiNST
PER rurts 191 (4th ed. 1942).
2 Carter v. Berry, 186 So. 2d 871 (Miss. 1962).
3 It has generally been held that in trusts in which the income is payable to the
beneficiary, the interest is presently vested even though distribution is to occur at some
future date. See, e.g., Hill v. Birmingham, 131 Conn. 174, 38 A.2d 604 (1944); Jackson
v. Langley, 234 N.C. 243, 66 S.E.2d 899 (1951). The court in the principal case adhered
to this line of reasoning at first, but the "desirability of meeting the issue head-on"
persuaded the court to treat the interests as contingent. Principal case at 850.
4 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 374; 4 ESTATEMFNT, PRoPERTY § 871 (1944); SIMES
& SMrrH, FuTuRE INTrasrs § 1265 (2d ed. 1956).
5 2 Meriv. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817).
6 E.g., Taylor v. Crosson, 11 Del. Ch. 145, 98 Ad. 875 (1916); Thomas v. Pullman
Trust & Sav. Bank, 871 Ill. 577, 21 N.E.2d 897 (1939); Kates v. Walker, 82 N.J.L. 157,
82 Adt. 801 (1912); Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 899, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960).
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to substantial criticism. 7 The rationale offered in justification of the all-
or-nothing rule, as it is called, is that to hold one part of a class gift void,
but another part valid, is to produce a result the testator never intended.6
Often, however, as seen in the principal case in which, by the terms of the
will, the children of the testator were expressly excluded, the testator's
intent would be practically ignored by allowing that portion of the estate
to pass by intestacy rather than to be sustained in part.9 In an attempt
to avoid such stringent consequences of the Rule Against Perpetuities,
there has been considerable legislative activity in recent years.' 0 Some
states 1 have enacted statutes which embody a "wait and see" doctrine,
whereby the duration of a contingency is measured by actual rather than
possible events. Under such a statute, a bequest which is contingent upon
settlement of the estate or the payment of a debt would be valid rather
than fail as a violation of the Rule,12 since the event is of a nature likely
to occur within a relatively short period. Another provision, which is
often seen linked to a "wait and see" statute, is one which automatically
reduces the age to twenty-one years when the interest is contingent upon
the beneficiary reaching an age in excess of twenty-one.'3 This type of
statutory provision is designed to correct the specific problem encountered
in the principal case. A third of the recent statutory developments gives
the courts a blanket cy pres14 power, enabling them, as was done in the
7 Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1329
(1938); Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HAI-v.
L. REv. 721 (1952).
8 Ryan v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 355, 64 A.2d 258, 264 (1949); 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 371, comment a (1944).
9 Testator already had made provisions for his two daughters, as was stated in his
will. By prior arrangements one had received $31,292 in cash plus substantial stock,
and the other $50,000 in cash and substantial stock.
10 For a short summary of recent trends in perpetuities legislation, see 5 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY ch. 75A (1962).
11 Ky. REV. STAT. § 381.216 (1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 197A (Supp. 1962); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.A (1950); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 11.98.010-.050 (Supp. 1961). The following "walt and see" statutes are applied only
to interests following life estates: CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-95 (1959); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. ch. 160, § 27 (Supp. 1962); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 1 (1955). See generally
Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HAIv. L. REv. 1349 (1954); Simes,
Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?: The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 Micir. L.
REv. 179 (1953). For an application of this doctrine without benefit of statute, see Mer-
chant's Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953).
12 For the general common-law treatment of interests contingent upon such events,
see 6 AM ACAN L W OF PROPERTY § 24.23 (Casner ed. 1952).
13 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 45-95 to 100 (1959); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 160, §§ 27-33
(Supp. 1962); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 197a (Supp. 1962); MASs. ANN. L.ws ch. 184A,
§§ 1-6 (1955); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 42-B. In addition to the provision concerning a
mandatory reduction in age, New York has also enacted a provision containing rules
of construction to approximate testator's intent. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42-C. Pro-
fessor Leach has said that if New York would pass a cy pres statute, every other state
would fall in line within a five-year period. Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail
Pennsylvania, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124, 1149 n.65 (1960).
14 "Cy pres means 'as nearly as may be.' The doctrine is a simple rule of judicial
construction, designed to aid the court to ascertain and carry out, as nearly as may be,
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principal case, to modify an invalid bequest to approximate most closely
the thwarted intent of the testator.15 In the absence of such a statute,
the application of this equitable doctrine, which has been traditionally
limited to charitable trusts,16 is almost entirely without precedent. The
only previous authority to be found is an early New Hampshire decision,17
in which an invalid trust for the testator's grandchildren, which was to
vest when the youngest reached forty, was modified cy pres so that it
terminated when the youngest reached twenty-one. This doctrine is still
extant in that jurisdiction, although at the time the decision did not
escape entirely without criticism.18
That there is a need for some degree of reform of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, so that it may meet the needs of modem times, no one seri-
ously disputes.19 Yet, judicial powers of correction being somewhat lim-
ited, it is generally felt that this burden must be borne by the legislatures.
2 0
While this may be conceded in the abstract, a court presented with a
validity question similar to that presented in the principal case might
very well apply the same cy pres doctrine to avoid harsh results;2'1 for
the apparent success of cy pres in those states in which it has been adopted
confirms its usefulness as a potential cure. New Hampshire is of special
interest, since its extension of cy pres beyond the area of charitable trusts
was without the benefit of legislation. Yet, this jurisdiction now enjoys
a workable doctrine as effective as that adopted by statute in other states.
Moreover, the New Hampshire rule and its equivalent adopted in the
principal case maintain a possible advantage over mandatory age-reduction
the intention of the donor of a gift to provide for the future." BALL.NTINE, LAW Dic-
TroNARY 324 (2d ed. 1948).
15 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1957) (applicable to trusts only); Ky. REv. STAT.
§§ 381.215-.223 (1962); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 501-03 (1959); WASH. Rav. CODE §§ 11.98-
.010-.050 (Supp. 1961).
16 See 2A BOMET, TRUSTS AND TRuSrEES § 431 (1953); 4 ScOar, TRUSTs § 399 (2d ed.
1956). See generally 2A BOGERT, op. cit. supra §§ 431-41; 4 ScoTr, op. cit. supra §§ 395-401.
17 Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 Atl. 900 (1891).
18 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, app. G. But see Leach, supra note 13, at 1130. Many
eminent writers in the field, however, have expressed approval of this doctrine, some
advocating statutory adoption. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's
Reign of Terror, 65 HARv. L. REv. 721 (1952); Quarles, The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its
Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumu-
lation, 21 N.Y.U.L. REV. 384 (1946); Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA.
L. REv. 707, 733 (1955); Simes, Reform of the Rule Against Perpetuities, Qualified En-
dorsement, 92 TRUSTS & ESrATES 770 (1953).
19 Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory Correctives, 73 HIv.
L. R v. 1318 (1960); Lynn, Reforming the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities,
28 U. Cm. L. REv. 488 (1961); Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its
Vest?, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 887 (1958); Waterbury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities
Reform, 42 MINN. L. REv. 41 (1957).
20 LEACH & TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrrIES app. 6 (1957).
21 But see Beverlin v. First Nat'l Bank, 151 Kan. 307, 312, 98 P.2d 200, 204 (1940),
where the court said, "Notwithstanding these divergent views, we think the rule in
Leake v. Robinson . . .having been followed by the Courts of England and America
for a century, has become an integral part of the common-law rule, and if a change
is to be made it must be made by the legislature."
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statutes, since the discretionary power left in the courts enables them to
dispose of the rare, but nevertheless conceivable situation in which total
invalidity would have been preferred by the testator. The objection has
been raised,2 2 however, that such broad discretion vests a court with the
arbitrary power to determine the intent of an individual who is unable
to contradict that determination. While this may be true, such discre-
tionary power is exercised by courts in many instances, such as in the
admission of a will to probate in which the necessary testamentary intent
is not entirely clear,2 3 or in the interpretation of statutes which require
determination of legislative intent to establish their meaning.24 Thus,
notwithstanding this objection, the equitable doctrine of cy pres can be
profitably employed in adapting the Rule Against Perpetuities to con-
temporary requirements.
T. K. Carroll
22 See Newhall, Reform of the Rule Against Perpetuities, Practitioner's View, 92
TRUSTS & ESTATES 773 (1953).
23 E.g., In re Saragavak's Estate, 35 Cal. 2d 93, 216 P.2d 850 (1950).
24 E.g., Rogers v. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 232 P.2d 766 (1951).
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